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This article explains asset securitization and shows how companies 
can use it to gain direct and indirect benefits. More importantly, 
this article demonstrates that securitization can enable certain 
companies to achieve a genuine reduction in financing costs by pro-
viding access to lower cost capital market funding. This article also 
explores potential innovative uses of this financing technique. 
"[Asset securitization is] becoming one of the dominant means of 
capital formation in the United States."l 
- Securities and Exchange Commission (1992). 
N ot only is asset securitization one of the most important financing vehicles in the United States, but its use is rapidly expanding worldwide. What is this innovative approach to financing that 
has taken the country, and begun to take the world, by storm? 
This article explains asset securitization and its unique benefits. The arti-
cle begins by describing the assct securitization process and then continues to show 
how companies directly and indirectly benefit from securitization. Most impor-
tantly, the article explains why securitization enables many companies to raise 
funds at a lower cost than through traditional financing. The discussiOn then turns 
to the differences between securitization and factoring, an antecedent financing 
technique. 
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1 Investment Company Act, Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 'II. 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992) (provided in connection with the issuance of 
Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940). The terms "securitization," "asset secu-
ritization," and "structured finance" are used interchangeably. Each refers to a company's use 
of cash flows from its assets to raise funding. The term "securitization" specifically refers to 
the issuance 0: securities backed by such cash flows. 
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The article then addresses its core question: is the securitization process a 
zero--sUDl game or does it truly reduce net financing costs? The short answer is sim-
ple: securitization is an alchemf that really works. In securitization, a company 
partly "deconstructs" itself by separating certain types of highly liquid assets from 
the risks generally associated with the company.3 The company can then use these 
assets to raise funds in the capital markets· at a lower cost than if the company, 
with its associated risks, could have raised the funds directly by issuing more debt 
or equity. The company retains the savings generated by these lower costs, while 
investors in the securitized assets benefit by holding investments with lower risk. 
The article concludes by describing those areas where securitization opportunities 
have yet to be fully explored. 
This article does not repeat the work of others by attempting to present em-
pirical evidence or a quantitative economic analysis of the efficiency of securitiza-
tion.s Instead, this article takes an analytical and rather common sense legal ap-
proach to understanding asset securitization. 
2 Alchemy refers to a technique whereby medieval chemists attempted to turn base 
metals into gold. 
3 This raises a threshold question of the propriety of separating a oompany from its 
most liquid assets. According to legend, a lawyer, upon learning of securitization, uttered that 
"it is a perversion of natural law if the jewels of a company could be spirited away by lawyers' 
trickery." This article will show that securitization ultimately prOVides benefits, to both the 
company and its investors, that outweigh any perceived detriments. 
• The capital markets are "markets where capital funds--debt and equity-are 
traded. Included are private placement sources of debt and equity as well as organized markets 
and exchanges." JOHN DOWNES &: JORDAN GooDMAN, DrC110NARYOF FINANCE AND INvESTMENT 
TERMS 59 (3d ed. 1991). 
5 For an excellent quantitative, economic, and empirical analysis of asset securitiza-
tion, see James A. Rosenthal &: Juan M. Ocampo, Analyzing the Economic Benefits of Securitized 
Credit, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32 (1992), to which the author of this article owes a debt of grati-
tude. Rosenthal and Ocampo analyzed the cost savings that General Motors Acceptance Cor-
poration ("GMAC") realized through securitizing its auto loan receivable;i over match funded 
traditional debt financing. They estimated that GMAC may have saved up to 1.3% annually. 
But if. George J. Benston, The Future of Asset Securitization: The Benefits and Costs of 
Breaking Up the Bank, in THE Gl..OBAL ASSET BACKED SECURITIES MARKET 3 (Charles Stone et al. 
ed8.,1993). Benstonfocused on whether securitization is rendering traditional banking obso-
lete, and his analysis is limited to the costs and benefits of securitizing a bank's own loans to its 
customers. However, this analysis is misleading when applied to the much broader universe of 
securitization discussed in this article. This article does not limit its discussion of originators 
to banks but also discusses unregulated industrial and commercial oompanies. Moreover, this 
article does not only analyze bank loans but also includes aU generic types of receivables. Fur-
thermore, because the originators discussed by Benston are entities that could directly access 
the capital markets for funding-as opposed to oompanies that are non-investment grade and 
therefore unable to obtain capital market funding directly, Benston Virtually ensures his con-
clusion that the benefits of securitization are indirect or marginal. Nonetheless, Benston still 
concludes that "securitization is here to stay because it has an important role to play." Id. at 
14. Part IV of this article addresses Benston's more fundamental argument that securitization 
can never create wealth. 
1994 Asset Securitization 135 
I. How Securitization Works 
A company that wants to obtain financing through securitization begins by 
identifying assets that can be used to raise funds.& These assets typically represent 
rights to payments at future dates and are usually referred to as "receivables.1¥7 The 
company that owns the receivables is usually called the "originator." The risk that 
these payments may not be made en time is an important factor in valuing the re-
ceivables. As long as the originator can reasonably predict the aggregate rate of 
default, however, it can securitize even those receivables that present some risk of 
uncollectibility. Therefore, a statistically large pool of receivables due from many 
obligors, for which payment is reasonably predictable, is generally preferable to a 
pool of a smaller number of receivables due from a few obligors. 
After identifying the assets to be used in the securitization, the originator 
transfers the receivables to a newly formed special purpose corporation, trust, or 
other legally separate entity-often referred to as a special purpose vehicle, or 
"SPV." The transfer is intended to separate the receivables from risks associated 
with the originator. For this reason, the originator will often structure the transfer 
so that it constitutes a "true sale/'S a sale that is sufficient under bankruptcy law to 
remove the receivables from the originator's bankruptcy estate.9 
To raise funds to purchase these receivables, the Spy issues securities in the 
capital markets. The SPY, however, must be structured as "bankruptcy remote" to 
gain acceptance as an issuer of capital market securities. Bankruptcy remote in this 
context means that the Spy is unlikely to be adversely affected by a bankruptcy of 
the originator.lo 
To achieve bankruptcy remoteness, the Spy's organizational structure 
strictly limits its permitted business activities. The goal is to prevent creditors 
(other than holders of the SPY's securities) from having claims against the Spy 
6 For an introduction to the fundamental principles of asset securitization, as well as 
the underlyipg legal and business considerations, see STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED 
FINANCE, A GuIDE To THE PRlNCIPLES OF AssET 5EcURmZATION (PractiSing Law lnst. 2d ed. 
1993). 
1 Receivables can be short term (typically due in 30 days), such as trade receivables, 
which represent the right to payment for goods sold or services rendered, or they can be long 
term, such as payments due over a period of years under loans, leases, licenses, management con-
tracts, etc. See id. at 5-15. 
8 See id. at 28-35; SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL AssETS § 5.02 Qason R P. Kravitt ed., 
1988). The term "true sale" sometimes creates confusion because the characterization of a given 
transfer as a sale could refer to the accounting, usury, tax, or bankruptcy treatment of the trans-
fer, each of which is governed by different criteria. ScHWARtz, supra note 6, at 28. 
9 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). S~ritization is unlikely to create a fraudulent convey-
ance under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code ~or equivalent state fraudulent transfer law), because 
the purchase price paid to the originator is normally a reasonable exchange for the receivables 
sold. See ScHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 35-36. 
It) See SECtJRITlZATION OF FINANCIAL AssETS, supra note 8, § 5.01; ScHWARCZ, supra note 
6, at 16-27. 
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that would enable them to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the SPV. l1 
Furthermore, an Spy that is owned or controlled by the originator is usually re-
quired to have one or more independent directors. The Spy must also attempt to 
observe all appropriate third party formalities with the originator. These additional 
steps help to reduce the risk that the originator, if bankrupt, will either cause the 
Spy to voluntarily file for bankruptcy or persuade a bankruptcy court, in the exer-
cise of its equitable powers, to substantively consolidate the assets and liabilities of 
the Spy with those of the originator.12 
II. How Companies Benefit from Securitization 
Through the securitization process described above, the Spy raises funds by 
issuing securities-usually debt or debt-like securities-and uses the receivables 
purchased from the originator to repay investors in the future. The investors, there-
fore, are concerned only with the cash flows coming due on these receivables, and 
care little about the originator's financial condition. '3 
Securitization is most valuable when the cost of funds, reflected in the inter-
est rate that is necessary to entice investors to purchase the SPY's securities, is less 
than the cost of the originator's other, direct sources of funding. The SPV's lower 
cost of funds is passed on to the originator through a higher selling price for the 
originator's receivables. The goal of securitization, therefore, is to obtain low cost 
capital market funding by separating all or a portion of an originator's receivables 
from the risks associated with the originator. 
The interest rate necessary to entice investors to purchase the SPY's securi-
ties is often a function of the "rating" that the SPY's debt securities receive. Such 
ratings are determined by various independent private companies that have gained 
widespread investor acceptance as "rating agencies."u Given that most investors, 
except certain institutional investors in private placement transactions (discussed be-
low), have neither the time nor the resourCes to fully investigate the financial condi· 
tion of the companies in which they invest, these ratings take on special significance. 
Investors rely on the assigned ratings to determine the minimum return that they 
will accept on a given investment. 
11 SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 24. 
12 [d. at 16-18, 21-26. 
13 For an illustration of this idea applied to hospitals, see Gregory R. Salathe, Note, 
Reducing Health Care Costs Tllrough Hospital Accounts Receivable Securitization, 80 VA. L. REv. 
549, 554-55 (1994). 
14 The most well-known and widely accepted rating agencies are Standard & Poor's 
Ratings Group ("S&P"') and Moody's Investors Service, Inc. ("Moody's"). Duff and Phelps and 
Fitch Investors Service, Inc., are also nationally prominent. 
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Companies whose debt securities are rated "investment grade"l5 can usually 
issue securities in the capital markets at interest rates competitive with, or even 
lower than, other generally available sources of funds, such as bank 10ans.16 The 
higher the company's rating within the investment grade categories, the lower the 
company's cost of funds. This reduced cost is a result of the lower interest rate neces-
sary to induce investors to buy the company's securities.17 
A securitization transaction can provide obvious cost savings by permitting 
an originator whose debt securities are rated less than investment grade or whose 
securities are unrated to obtain funding through an SPV whose debt securities have 
an investment grade rating. Even an originator with an investment grade rating 
may derive benefit from securitization if the SPV can issue debt securities with a 
higher investment grade rating and, as a result, significantly decrease the origina-
tor's interest costs. 
One might expect securitization to be of greatest benefit to riskier compa-
nies. This expectation, however, is only partly true. As a company moves toward 
the extremes of financial instability and towards the brink of bankruptcy, securiti-
zation is less of a benefit. At this point, the SPV has a higher than normal risk of 
being challenged by the originator's trustee in bankruptcy, and risk-averse investors 
tend to avoid these transactions. 
Asset securitization does, however, afford companies with acceptable risk 
levels the possibility of real cost savings. To determine whether an originator will 
achieve an overall cost savings from securitization, one must assess the interest sav-
ings possible (as discussed above) against the costs of the securitization transaction. 
A company considering securitization should compare (i) the expected differential 
between interest payable on non-securitized financing and interest payable on seen-
15 An investment grade rating typically is BBB- or higher from S&P or Baa3 or higher 
from Moody's, or the equivalent from the other rating agencies. Such a rating reflects a rating 
agency's prediction that the securities will be paid on a timely basis. Short term securities, such 
as commercial paper, are assigned equivalent short tenn ratings. For a general discussion of 
ratings see SECURITIZA nON OF FINANCIAL A<;sETS, supra note 8, § 7.01. 
16 For a discussion of the relative costs involved in the different markets, see Steven 
Pearlstein & Jerry Knight, Banks Lose Out As Depositors Go Elsewhere; Many Options Available 
for Saving, Borrowing, Investing, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1993, at AI; Mitchell A. Post, Tile Evolu-
tion of The U.S. Commercial Paper Market Since 1980, 78 FED. REs. BULL. 879 (1992). Capital 
market rates are usually lower because the large number of investors, as well as the free trans-
ferability of the securities, act as inherent risk spreaders. 
17 For example, at any point in time, the interest rate on securities rated Aaa (the high-
est rating) by Moody's will be less than the interest rate needed to attract investors on securi-
ties rated Baa by Moody'S. This difference is illustrated by the following chart: 
MoodV's Series 1992 1993 March 25 1994 
Aaa 6.09 5.38 5.35 
Baa 6.48 5.82 5.80 
Source: 80 FED. REs. BULL., A26, Domestic Financial Statistics Oune 1994). 
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rities issued by an applicable SPV with (ii) the expected difference in transaction 
costs between the alternative funding options.18 Whether or not the originator will 
achieve a cost savings partially depends on the way in which the originatorstruc-
tures the securitization because, as will be shown below, transaction costs can vary 
over a wide range. 
A. "'One-Off" Securitization Structures 
In most securitization transactions, the Spy is created specifically for the 
particular originator and the particular transaction. The objective of this so-called 
"one-off" securitization is to prOvide the. originator with significant flexibility to 
customize the securitization in terms of its particular structure and the types of 
capital market securities issued. However, because one-off structures are created for 
a particular transaction, their transaction costs can be high; they can rarely 
achieve the transaction cost economies of scale realized by multiseller securitiza-
tion conduits (discussed in the nextsection).19 In addition, to avoid subjecting the 
originator to the liabilities of a thinly capitalized SPV,tax and accounting rules 
require a minimum level of capital, typically one to three percent of the amount of 
the securities issued. In contrast, a multiseller securitization conduit needs only 
nominal capital because the multiplicity of sellers reduces the risk that the Spy 
will be regarded as the alter ego of anyone seller. Given these differences, only a 
case-by-case comparison of costs and other motivations will determine whether a 
one-off or multiseller structure is more advantageous to a partictilar originator. 
Presently, one-off transactions are structured in a multitude of ways, and 
new structures are limited only by the creativity of the professionals involved. 
While it is beyond this article's scope to attempt to categorize all available struc-
tures,l° a catalog of approaches would begin by identifying the types of capital 
market securities to be issued by the SPY. 
Originators desiring medium or long term financing can often access the capi-
tal markets through "securitized private placement transactions." In these trans-
actions, an SPY is created for a specific deal and issues medium term or long term 
notes, usually to sophisticated institutional investors such as insurance companies. 
A private placement takes advantage of the one-olf structure because the private 
placement's requirements are determined primarily by the investors, who actively 
18 If, however, the securitization transaction is off balance sheet, a strict debt-to-d.ebt. 
comparison may understate securitization's benefits. Off balance sheet secuntization has its 
own inherent advantages because it does not put pressure on the originator to raise additional 
equity ca~ital. See Rosenthal & Ocampo, supra note 5, at 33. . 
9 Significant economies of scale can be obtained, however, by originators such as 
GMAC, Citibank, and Chrysler that frequently use an Spy to issue capital market securities. 
20 For a representative catalog of structures, see SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL AssETS, 
supra note 8, § 4. 
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participate in analyzing the receivables and negotiating the structure of the deal 
with the originator. In addition, the investors' sophistication allows for a great 
deal of creativity in bo.th the structure and type of receivables used. The SPY's se~ 
curities only need to be rated if the investors so require. Investors, particularly in 
the case of insurance companies, often use the rating to avoid placing the purchased 
securities in the so-called "basket" of non-eligible investments.21 The interest rate 
<n such securities may, however, be higher than normal because privately placed 
securities cannot be freely traded.21 
Investment grade originators that have highly predictable receivables, or 
that obtain investment grade credit enhancement, may be able to offer long term se-
curities publicly through an Spy to investors in the capital markets. Because of the 
demand for publicly traded securities, this type of transa.ction would provide long 
term financing with the lowest interest rate cost to the originator. The transaction 
costs of a public offering, howevert are high. Not only must an Spy be created spe-
cifically for the financing, but it also must prepare and file a registration statement 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (USEC"). In contrast to a private 
placement transaction, which can be accomplished in a period of weeks, a filing 
with the SEC can take months to accomplish. In addition, the level of due diligence 
reqUired to satisfy the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws can be 
dauntingP For this reason, public securitization is rarely cost effective for transac-
tions of less than $50 million and is more common for transactions in the $100 minion 
or higher range.14 
The repayment of securities issued in one-off securitization structures is of-
ten guaranteed in whole or in part by creditworthy third parties in the business of 
assessing this kind of risk, such as banks (through the issuance of letters of credit) or 
surety companies (through surety bonds). The providers of these guarantees, often 
referred to as credit enhancement facilities, make independent decisions whether to 
extend such enhancement and how much to charge for it. Although obtaining credit 
:1.1 Insurance companies are limited, for example, in the amoWlt of new insurance poli-
cies they may issue by the amoWlt of their eligible investments, which are usually defined as se-
curities rated at least investment grade, and other eligible assets. For the "basket" provision of 
the NY Insurance Code, see N.Y. INs. LAW§ 1404 (b) (Conso1.1993). 
22 See ScHwARCZ, supra note 6, at 62-63. In an attempt to increase the efficiency and 
liquidity of the private placement market, the SEC has issued Rule 144A. This rule permits the 
relatively free trading of privately placed securities to buyers (referred to as "qualified institu-
tional buyers," or "oms") who have more than $100 million in the aggregate owned and in-
vested in securities on a discretionary basis (or $10 million in securities with respect to deal-
ers). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1993). 
23 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 US.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988)j Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 US.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988). State securities, or so-called "blue-sky," 
laws may': also be applicable. 
24 Recently, however, the SEC revised its forms to provide the benefit of shelf registra-
tion to securitized public offerings of investment grade securities. See ScHwARCZ, supra note 6, 
at 62 n.l56; SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL AssETS, supra note 8, § 10,01. 
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enhancement adds to transaction costs, the net effect may reduce total costs because 
securities supported by credit enhancement obtain higher credit ratings. As a result, 
the interest rate payable on such securities will be lower. 
B. Multiseller Securitization Conduits 
A "multiseller securitization conduit" offers originators the opportunity to 
minimize their transaction costs by utilizing a rommon SPY. These conduits are 
typically administered by commercial or investment banks and are able to achieve 
a transaction cost economy of scale by allowing multiple originators to sell re-
ceivables to a single pre-existing SPV.25 
To date, most multiseller securitization conduits have accommodated only 
investment grade originators. This selectivity minimizes the risk-already ren-
dered unlikely because of the bankruptcy remote structure-that a single origina-
tor's bankruptcy might adversely impact a conduit engaged in transactions with 
many originators.2b However, a limited number of multiseller securitization con-
duits have recently begun to serve originators whose debt securities are rated less 
than investment grade. As a result, more originators are now able to take advantage 
of the transaction cost economy of scale. 
Multiseller securitization conduits, like one-off structures, may benefit from 
credit enhancement. However, multiseller conduits usually issue short term securi-
ties, such as commercial paper. Rating agencies will determine the ratings of such 
short term securities based not only on the ultimate risk of default but also on the 
probability of timeliness of payment. As a result, rating agencies often insist t ha t 
creditworthy third parties ensure timely payment. "Liquidity" facilities, usually 
provided by banks, help to assure that the multiseller conduit will have the liquid-
ity available to meet short term financial obligations in the event that cash flow 
from collections is temporarily insufficient. Providers of liquidity facilities are 
then repaid by collections on receivables when received. In most instances, the con-
duit will be able to pay maturing short term debt securities through its collections on 
purchased receivables or by re-issuing commercial paper. Only when these sources 
25 MultiseUer securitization conduits typically issue short tenn commercial paper or 
medium term notes in the capital markets to fund their purchases of receivables from originators. 
See, e.x., Corporate Asset Funding Co., Inc., FITCH INVESTORS SERVICE, STRUCTURED FINANCE, NEW 
ISSUE, June 15,1992, at 81 (discussing Corporate Asset Funding Co., Inc:s $7 billion commercial 
paper and medium term note program); Mark H. Adelson, Asset-Backed Commercial Paper: Un-
derstandinx the Risks, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, STRUCTURED FlNANC'E, SPECIAL REpORT, Apr. 
1993. 
20 Furthermore, by limiting a conduit to serving investment grade originators, transac-
tion costs can be reduced because the transfer of receivables from the originator to the conduit 
need not be structured as a true sale. See infra note 33; ScHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 35; SKU-
RlTIZA nON OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, supra note 8, § 5.03. 
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are not sufficient to meet the conduit's short term financial obligations will liquid-
ity facilities need to be funded to assure the conduit of the necessary cash flOW.27 
The result is that multiseller securitization conduits typically utilize both 
liquidity facilities and credit enhancement. Providers of liquidity facilities often 
insist that conduits obtain credit enhancement as well to emphasize that the li-
quidity facilities providers are ensuring only timeliness of payment and not guaran-
teeing against ultimate loss. They also may require credit enhancement if they are 
uncomfortable with the structure or the level of security of a given transaction. 
Because liquidity facilities and credit enhancement significantly reduce 
risk on securities issued by a multi seller conduit/8 rating agencies base their evalua-
tions of such securities primarily on the liquidity and credit enhancement facilities 
that the conduit obtains.29 Obtaining these facilities wilt however, add to transac-
tion costs, and their value in reducing interest costs must be adjusted accordingly.30 
C. Indirect Costs and Benefits 
The preceding sections discussed how variations in securitization structures 
can affect direct transaction costs and flexibility. Each structure is also associated 
with certain indirect costs and benefits. For example, transaction cost'> are not lim-
ited to direct expenses, such as fees for lawyers, investment bankers, and liquidity or 
credit enhancement facilities. They also arise from the true sale requirement}! 
To achieve a true sale, an originator must limit, if not forego, its right to the 
residual value of the receivables sold to the SPY. This residual value can often be 
significant since the Spy must obtain a level of receivables well in excess of the 
amount necessary to pay the securities issued by the SPY. Such 
"overcollateralization" is needed to assure investors and providers of liquidity and 
credit enhancement that they will not suffer losses from delayed collection or de-
faults. Conflict may develop over the amount of overcollateralization necessary for 
the SPY: originators want the level of overcollateralization to be low, while in-
vestors and credit enhancers want it to be high. Because the amount of receivables 
27 Rating agencies usually require, however, that entities prOViding liquidity facilities 
have short term debt ratings at least equal to the ratings of the conduit's commercial paper. 
28 For a discussion of the types of liquidity facilities and credit enhancement available 
in different settings, see SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 13-15; Salathe, supra note 13, at 552. 
29 The rating agencies also consider the strength of the originator, the bankruptcy re-
moteness of the structure, and the experience and capability of the conduit's administrator and 
servicer. 
30 In the author's experience, the cost of credit enhancement ranges between 0.40% and 
0.75% of the amount of credit extended, and the cost of liquidity ranges between 0.15% and 
0.35% of the amount of the oommitment made available. These amounts fluctuate depending on 
the particular transaction and the supply of suitable parties willing to provide such enhance-
ment or li:;Iuidity. 
3 See SCHwARCZ, supra note 6, at 28-29; SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL AssETS, supra 
note 8, § 5.03. 
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sold may tum out to be greater than what was needed to pay the SPY's securities, 
the overpayment represents an indirect, but real, cost to the originator. 
The cost of overcollateralization can be managed in several ways. If the 
originator's rating is investment grade, it often can structure the transfer of re-
ceivables to the Spy as a sale for accounting but not necessarily bankruptcy pur-
poses. After the Spy pays off its securities, the excess receivables and collections 
can be returned to the originator without altering the original accounting charac-
terization of the transaction as a sale.32 
If the originator is not investment grade, a sale for bankruptcy purposes will 
be required to protect investors from the risks associated with the originator's pos-
sible bankruptcy. This bankruptcy risk can be avoided, while minimizing the cost of 
overcollateralization, by structuring the securitization transaction with two Spy s 
in a two tier structure, also known as a "PINeO" (finance company) structure.J ) Un-
der this method, the originator first sells receivables to a wholly owned Spy in a 
transaction that constitutes a true sale for bankruptcy purposes and thus achieves 
bankruptcy protection. The wholly owned Spy then transfers its receivables to an 
independent Spy in a transaction that constitutes a sale for accounting purposes but 
not necessarily for bankruptcy purposes. The independent SPY issues securities in 
the capital markets to fund the transfer. After the independent SPY pays off the 
securities, it can reconvey the remaining receivables and collections to the wholly 
owned SPY without impairing the accounting characterization as a sale. The 
wholly owned Spy is then merged into the originator, or alternatively, the remain-
ing receivables and collections are transferred back to the originator, as dividends. 
This structure thus allows the originator to realize the value of any excess re-
ceivables and collections created by the original overcollateralization.34 
The indirect benefits of securitization will often more than compensate for 
its indirect costs. One of the most important indirect benefits is that asset securiti-
zation provides a source of off balance sheet funding. Because a securitization is 
usually viewed, for accounting purposes, as a sale of assets and not as financing, the 
originator does not record the transaction as a liability 00 its balance sheet. Such 
32 See ScHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 28-29. 
33 See id. at 21-22. 
34 A recent theory of ''binary recourse" may pennit a bankruptcy true sale directly 
from the originator to the SPV while permitting the Spy to reconvey a significant portion of ex-
cess collections back to the originator. See Steven L. Schwarcz, A New Theory of Recourse, 
AssET SALES REP., Feb. 14, 1994, at 8; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts are Greater Than the Whole: 
How Securitization of Divi$ible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open The 
Capital Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 1993COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 139 (1993) [hereinafter 
Schwarcz, Divisible Interests]. 
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off balance sheet funding thus raises capital without increasing the originator's 
leverage or debt-to-equity ratio on its financial statements.35 
Another benefit of asset securitization is that it may represent an addi-
tional and untapped source of financing for an originator. Sometimes originators 
will find that investor appetite for their securities has become temporarily sated. 
In other words, the amount of originator risk exposure that the capital markets are 
prepared to accept may be less than the amount of capital market financing desired 
by the originator. In these cases, securitization permits the originator to obtain ad-
ditional capital market funding through an SPY. This change in form is not an at-
tempt to mislead investors. Investors are often prepared to accept the more limited 
risks associated with the SPY, namely the default risk of the receivables, as com-
pared to the greater risk associated with the originator as a whole. As a result, by 
providing an additional source of capital market funding, securitization can be bene-
ficial even to investment grade originators. 
Certain securitizations may also result in a lower weighted average interest 
rate to the originator through the use of a "senior I subordinate" securities structure 
at the SPY level. Sophisticated investors provide the equivalent of "credit en-
hancement" to the Spy by purchasing subordinated securities. The originator 
thereby allocates certain repayment risks to these investors, who are in the business 
of assessing and accepting such risks and who consequently are willing to accept a 
higher level of risk than the average investor. The interest rate on these subordi-
nated securities would be higher than the interest rate on the non-subordinated (or 
senior) securities to compensate for the greater risk. Nonetheless, this combination 
of senior and subordinated securities will still be of benefit to the originator if, as is 
usually the case, the resulting blended interest rate on the combined securities is 
lower than the rate that would have been applicable if only one class of securities 
had been issued. 
The senior I subordinate structure can also be used to expand the universe of 
parties available to provide credit enhancement. An entity providing external 
credit enhancement in the form of a guarantee or its equivalent is usually required to 
have a credit rating at least equal to that of the securities being guaranteed. How-
ever, the number of highly rated credit enhancers-including banks-is relatively 
smalL Moreover, because of high capital reserve requirements,36 third party credit 
enhancement provided by regulated institutions such as banks has become very ex-
pensive. But investors in subordinated securities have ro rating requirement. The 
35 Investors would view securitization in the same light as accountants do under gen-
erally accepted accounting principles. See FIN. Acer. STANDARDS BD., FIN. STATEMENT OF Acer. 
STANDARDS No. 77 (1983). See SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 2-3; SECURITIZATION OF FINANOAL 
AsSETS, supra note 8, § 3.02. However, others, such as rating agencies, may adopt different 
views. 
36 See SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 68-70, 73-75. 
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credit enhancement comes from their initial cash investment in the SPV's subordi-
nated securities. Because the proceeds of the SPV's subordinated securities are used 
to purchase receivables and thereby further overcollateralize the SPY's senior securi-
ties, the subordinated securities supplement the means by which the senior securi-
ties are paid. 
IlL Securitization Distinguished from Factoring 
Tra.ditionally used in the textile and apparel industries, factoring, like secu-
ritization, entails a sale of receivables to generate cash. Given the superficial simi-
larities between the two financing techniques, it is useful to compare them and con-
sider when each applies. 
Factoring, in its purest form . .. involves only the purchase of ac-
counts receivable (or "receivables") by the factor from the party 
(called the II client") with whom it has a factoring contract. The client 
assumes all risks of nonpayment of the receivable except the 
"financial inability of the account debtor (customer) to pay." ... The 
factor agrees to pay on a monthly basis for purchased receivables at 
a date computed under the contract, usually called the II average ma-
turity date" or adjusted average maturity date. The customer is 
immediately notified of the sale of the receivable to the factor and is 
instructed to make all payments directly to the factor.37 
In a factoring transaction the factor is typically a pre-existing finance com-
pany which realizes its profits by buying receivables from clients at a discount. Se-
curitization, in contrast, usually involves the creation of a bankruptcy remote Spy 
which purchases receivables from the originator and issues asset-backed securities 
into the capital markets. Whereas factors rely on their expertise in collection to re-
duce their risk of loss, the SPY minimizes its risk through the purchase of quality 
receivables with predictable rates of default.38 The differences between securitiza-
tion and factoring, however, are not rigid and begin to blur in certain instances. For 
example, there are fewer differences between securitization and factoring in transac-
tions where an SPY borrows funds from non-capital market sources instead of issu-
ing securities, or where a factor funds itself through the issuance of capital market 
securities. 
Nonetheless, traditional factoring is not obsolete. For many small and me-
dium size companies, the costs associated with creating an Spy or registering debt 
31 PETER H WEIL, FACTORING IN ASSET BASED f'lNANONG: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE § 
27.01 [1] (Matthew Bender ed., 1985). 
38 SalatM, supra note 13, at 562. 
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securities prohibit them from securitizing. In these cases, factoring may provide a 
lower cost financing technique. 
Hospitals currently face a choice between factoring and securitization tech-
niques. Health care receivables are a large and relatively untapped source of assets 
which hospitals can use to meet their financing needs. Which is more effident-
factoring or securitizing these receivables? 
A 1991 study compared the advantages and disadvantages presented by se-
curitization for the health care field.3 ' The authors pointed out that an "old line" 
factor often buys receivables at a discount of five to ten percent, while at the same 
time charging a factoring fee that may be as high as fifteen to twenty percent of the 
value of the receivables sold!O In addition, a factor will not advance all of the 
funds up front. As a result, the authors estimated that securitization would provide 
between thirty and forty percent more funds in advance than would old line factor-
ing,,1 The funding differential may be attributed primarily to the deep discount 
taken by the factor to protect itself and insure its profits. The SPY, en the other 
hand, funds itself through the capital markets, which act as a natural risk 
spreader by distributing the securities over many investors. 
In certain circumstances, the principles used in securitization and factoring 
may be combined to obtain even lower cost funding than through either conventional 
securitization or old line factoring. For example, hospitals as well as small and 
medium size companies may be able to benefit from structures, such as the "divisible 
interest" structure/2 that provide capital market funding without the extra cost of 
creating an intermediary SPY. 
In the divisible interest structure, an originator would sell, for a negotiated 
fixed price, its rights in a pool of receivables equal to one hundred percent of all col-
lections up to a "trigger point" (and possibly also a fixed percentage of collections 
above the trigger point). Once fixed, there is no adjustment to the purchase price, 
irrespective of actual collections, and because the transfer is directly from the origi-
nator of the receivables to the issuer of the securities, there is no need to create an 
intermediary SPY, as in the two-tier structure") Thus, the divisible interest struc-
39 Sandra Ferconio & Michael Lane, Financing Mnneuvers: Two Opportunities to 
Boost a Hospital's Working Capital, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Oct. 1991, at 74. 
40 See id. at 76. 
4\ See id. at 80. 
42 See Schwarcz, Divisible Interests, supra note 34, at 149. The divisible interest 
structure eliminates the need for a bankruptcy remote subSidiary, and thereby permits multiple 
originators to obtain economies of scale by pooling their receivables in a single securitization 
transaction. As a practical matter, however, the use of these innovative structures, which raise 
issues of first impression in the absence of case law directly on point, may be limited to private 
placements with sophisticated investors until there are sufficient precedents decided or until a 
sufficient number of transactions are done so as to create investor and rating agency comfort. 
43 Id. at 155-60. 
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ture permits multiple originators to pool their receivables in a single securitization 
and thereby achieve economies of scale." It also reduces the transaction costs (e.g., 
double set of documentation, creation, and capitalization of an intermediary SPV, 
and appointment of independent directors) of a two-tier structure. Therefore, the 
combination of concepts from securitization and factoring can lead to innovative and 
synergistic structures and approaches.4s 
IV. Does Securitization Reduce Net Financing Costs? 
A "zero-sum game" is one in which one person's benefit exactly offsets an-
other person's loss, so that the net payoff of the entire game is zero. Is securitiza-
tion a zero-sum game, or does it create a genuine costreduction for parties? 
Only an empirical study would fully answer this question. Such a study is 
not only beyond the scope of this article, but difficult to envision given that the cor-
porate finance world rarely lends itself to controlled experiments. Nonetheless, a 
common sense analysis indicates that securitization Can create a net cost savings. 
This article has shown that, despite its transaction costs, securitization can 
be less expensive than alternative funding sources because it enables originators to 
obtain low cost capital market funding. Even investment grade originators who a 1-
ready have direct access to capital market funding may prefer securitization be-
cause of its indirect benefits, such as the provision of off balance sheet funding. Al-
though indirect benefits are harder to quantify, many companies that use securiti-
zation are investment grade. This fact is significant when one considers that profit 
maximizing companies generally do not engage in activities whose benefits are illu-
sory. 
These observations leave unanswered, however, the question whether secu-
ritization enables originators to realize a gain at the expense of others, such as the 
originator's unsecured general creditors. For example, some critics have argued th a t 
unsecured creditors are harmed by securitization because it reduces the amount of 
the originator's unencumbered assets available for debt repayment!6 This argument 
is flawed, however; securitization merely replaces one type of asset, receivables, 
with another type, cash. The unsecured creditor has the same amount of unencum-
bered assets to levy against after the securitization as it did before the securitiza-
tion. 
Other critics have argued that securitization could hurt creditors because 
the cash received is unlikely to stay within the originator." The originator, they 
.. Id. at 154-55. 
<5 See Schwarcz, A New Theory of Recourse, supra note 34, at 9. 
46 Cf. Paul M. Shupack,. Boundaries and Definitions: A Commentary on Dean Baird, 80 
VA. L. REv. (forthcorningNov.l994). 
47 Chase W. AshIey, Comment: When a Company Securitizes, Its Creditors Face Higher 
Risks, AM. BANKE~, May 7, 1993, at 4. 
1994 Asset Securitization 147 
say, may speculate or fraudulently transfer the cash. Given that the originator 
will have already sold its receivables, the originator will have to wait until new 
receivables are created and mature for its cash flow to regenerate:$ This dissipa-
tion of cash may eventually result in a liquidity crisis unless the securitization can 
be repeated or refinanced. 
One cannot assume wasteful behavior simply because an originator sells its 
receivables for cash. In fact, given the scrutiny imposed by rating agencies and 
other independent parties such as credit enhancers, securitization may present 
fewer opportunities for self-dealing than other financing methods. Nonetheless, 
securitization, just like any other sale of assets by an originator, may become suspect 
if implemented when an originator is on the brink of bankruptcy. An originator, for 
example, may be seeking to convert receivables into cash to make preferential pay-
ments to certain creditors or even to fraudulently hide assets. The potential for such 
suspect actions, however, is not unique to securitization transactions. The same is-
sues would arise, for example, if on the eve of bankruptcy an originator sold, or bor-
rowed money by encumbering, a factory or equipment and similarly sought to dissi-
pate the sale or loan proceeds. Such questionable uses of proceeds are more appro-
priately addressed by preference49 and fraudulent conveyance laws,so which seek to 
ensure equality of distribution of a debtor's estate. 
The Delaware Supreme Court recently put debtors 00 notice that near-
bankrupt corporations must be mindful of their responsibilities to act in their credi-
tors' interests and not to their detriment. In Credit Lyonnais Bank v. Pathe Commu-
nications/I the court noted that a board of directors of a corporation in the "vicinity 
of insolvency" owes a fiduciary duty not only to its shareholders but also to its 
48 ld. 
09 11 U.S.c. § 547 (1988). Shupack contends that: 
any sale of an asset has the consequence of turning a less liquid asset into 
cash. The risk to creditors of the debtor resulting from any sale is not the sale 
transaction itself, but the subsequent dissipation by the debtor of the cash real-
ized. All sales and security interests in the debtor's assets carry with them the 
same risk ofremoving an asset from the debtor's estate and the attendant risk 
of diSSipation. 
Shupack, supra note 46 (emphasis added). Also, as stated previously, securitization is of least 
benefit when the originator is on the verge of bankruptcy, because of the increased likelihood 
that such securitiution will be challenged by the originator's creditors. Therefore, the risk of 
the dissipation of funds raised by a near insolvent originator may only have limited practical 
importance for securitization. 
so 11 U.s.c. § 548 (1988) and applicable state laws. For a discussion of fraudulent 
conveyance law, see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact of Fraudulent Conveyance Law on Future 
Advances Supported by Upstream Guaranties and Security Interests, 9 CAROOZO L. REv. 729 
(1987); 5cHWARcz, supra note 6, at 35-36. 
51 No. 12150, 1991 LEXIS 215, at *108 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
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creditors. This ruling gives greater assurance that a troubled corporation will not 
speculate with the cash received from a securitization to the detriment of creditors. 
The question nonetheless remains; does securitization genuinely reduce net 
financing costs? A possible method of testing this hypothesis is to examine it in 
light of the principle of "exposure conservation." This principle states that: 
Secured creditors will charge lower interest rates because security 
reduces their risks, but unsecured creditors will raise their interest 
rates in response because security reduces the assets 00 which they 
can levy, and so increases their risksY The interest rate reductions 
are precisely matched by interest rate increasesj hence, the firm 
makes no net gain from granting security.53 
If one assumes, arguendo, that the principle of exposure conservation means 
that unsecured creditors will raise their rates in response to a debtor's securitiza-
tion, just as they would in response to a debtor's secured financing, the principle 
would indicate that the rise in unsecured interest rates should precisely match the 
rate reduction granted by the secured creditor in return for taking collateral. As a 
result, the originator would realize no net gain. 
The principle of exposure conservation assumes that interest rates do not 
vary with the source of financing. A securitization, however, provides a new source 
of financing-the capital markets, whose rates are systematically lower than the 
rates at which small or medium size firms commonly borrow. Prior to engaging in a 
securitization, an originator is financing itself through secured and unsecured loans. 
After the securitization, the originator raises funds by accessing the capital mar-
kets through the SPV. 
52 Where pre-existing creditors receive security for their antecedent debt, the granting 
of security reduces the assets on which the remaining unsecured creditors can levy and thereby 
increases the risk for such unsecured creditors. The preference laws address such potential 
inequality. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). To the extent that creditors offer new money at lower 
interest rates in return for security, the analysis of whether there is increased risk to unsecured 
creditors would appear to be similar to that previously set forth in this article. However, the 
analysis of whether the granting of security increases risk is beyond the scope of this article. 
Compare Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property~Based Theory of Security Inter-
ests: Taking Debtor's Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming Nov. 1994) with Alan 
Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 1994). 
53 Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VA NO. L. REV. 1051, 1054 
(1984) (emphasis deleted); if. Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital Corpora-
tion Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. BeON. REv. 261 (1958). In a perfect universe, 
every savings achieved by changing One part of a company's capital structure will result in off-
setting costs to other parts of the capital structure, including by taking advantage of third par-
ties. Securitization achieves a net cost savings because the universe is imperfect. 
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The transformation from secured financing to capital market funding with 
its comparatively lower interest rate thus can reduce net financing costS.54 So long as 
the added transaction costs are less than the interest saved by using securitization 
instead of secured financing, the principle of exposure conservation supports the 
proposition that securitization creates a net gain. The following examples help to 
illustrate this point. 
An originator with $100 million of unsecured debt, bearing an interest rate of 
X percent, plans to repay $50 million of this unsecured debt with the proceeds of a 
new $50 million issuance of secured debt. The principle of exposure conservation 
states that the interest rate on the secured debt will be reduced to X-Y percent, but 
this reduction in rate will be matched by an interest rate increase on the remaining 
unsecured debt to X+Y percent. This analysis assumes that the unc;ecured creditors 
are free to adjust to a market rate. Therefore, according to the theory, the origina-
tor makes no net gain from granting security. 
If this Originator repaid the $50 million of the unsecured debt from the pro-
ceeds of a securitization, instead of from the issuance of secured debt, the interest 
rate on the remaining unsecured debt would again rise to X+Y percent.55 However, 
54 As illustrated by the following chart, the interest rate on commercial paper was 
consistently lower than that of the bank prime loan rate over the last 3 years. 
1992 1993 Au~ust, 1994 
Commercial Paper 3.71 3.17 4.65 
1- Month 
Commercial Paper 3.75 3.22 4.84 
3 - Month 
Commercial Paper 3.80 3.30 5.19 
6 - Month 
Prime Rate 6.25 6.00 7.51 
Source: 80 FED. RES. BULL., A25, A26, Domestic Financial Statistics (Nov. 1994). 
55 The increase in the unsecured borrowing rate is assumed to be the same whether 
triggered by secured financing or securitization. In practice, however, such rate increase will 
be less for securitization because, as previously discussed, securitization merely replaces re-
ceivables with cash and therefore does not reduce the assets on which unsecured creditors can 
levy. Furthermore, securitization does not affect a company's leverage ratio for financial re-
porting purposes. A precise comparison of the differences that may affect unsecured creditors 
between securitization and secured financing is subtle and depends on the structure of the 
transaction. For example, in a securitization, any excess receivables sold mayor may not be 
available to repay unsecured creditors once the securitized debt is paid, while in a secured fi-
nancing excess collateral may be used to repay unsecured creditors once the secured debt is 
paid. On the other hand, in a securitization if the receivables sold are insufficient to pay the 
securitized debt the holders of such debt will have no claim against the originator's remaining 
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because capital market rates are generally lower than secured financing rates (as 
shown in note 51), the interest rate on the securitized debt will reduce to X-'i-A per-
cent (where A percent represents the rate differential between capital market and 
secured financing rates). 
If securitization bore no transaction costs, the originator would save exactly 
A percent of $50 million in annual interest costs by refinancing through a securitiza-
tion rather than secured financing. The originator's actual cost saving, however, 
would be at least partially offset by transaction costs. But as long as an originator's 
interest and transaction costs for a securitization are less than the costs of a secured 
financing, securitization will create a net cost savings by providing access to lower 
cost capital market funding. 
But why should the capital markets be prepared to fund securitization 
transactions at a lower rate than secured financing? At least one explanation is that 
securitization serves as a means of reducing "monitoring costs," a theory originally 
presented by Jackson and Kronman in the secured financing arena.S6 Because the in-
terest rate m the loan is determined when the loan is made, a borrower may take 
actions that increase the loan's riskiness after the loan is made. Jackson and Kron-
man argue that a creditor will incur certain monitoring costs as a result to ensure 
that the borrower's actions do not increase the riskiness of the loan.57 In this regard, 
a secured creditor should have lower monitoring costs than an unsecured creditor be-
cause the secured creditor needs to monitor the borrowers actions only in regard to 
the collateral backing its loan and can disregard how the borrower acts generally.s8 
Subsequent commentators have argued, however, that secured financing may 
not reduce, and indeed may increase, the need to monitor the borrower's financial 
condition. The reason is that if the borrower enters bankruptcy, an automatic stay 
will freeze the secured creditor's ability to exercise remedies against the collateral 
and thereby impair the secured creditor's collateral position.59 As a result, the se-
cured creditor has a significant interest in ensuring the continued viability of the 
borrower and will incur monitoring costs to further that interest in addition to the 
costs of monitoring the collateral. 
assets. In a secured financing if the collateral is insufficient to pay the secured debt;. the holders 
of such debt generally may assert an unsecured claim against the originator's remaining assets, 
and such unsecured claim win be pari passu with the originator's other unsecured claims. See 
11 U.S.c. § 506(a) (1988). Accordingly, the author believes that the assumption used in this ar-
ticle as to the increase in the unsecured borrowing rate may be overly conservative; therefore, 
the actual net cost saving enjoyed by the originator may be even greater than portrayed. 
56 Thomas H Jackson &; Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities 
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L. J. 1143 (1979). 
57 [d. at 1149. 
58 Id. at 1153. 
S9 11 U.s.c. § 362(a)(5); see also ScHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 29-30; SECURlTlZATION OF 
FINANCIAL AssETS, supra note 8, § 5.05. 
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In a securitization, on the other hand, the originator's receivables are sold 
to a bankruptcy remote Spy in a "true sale." Consequently, a bankruptcy of the 
originator would not adversely affect the ability of investors to receive paymen.t m 
their asset·backed securities.6P Because a bankruptcy remote structure separates the 
s.ource of payment of the SPY's securities from the risks associated with the origina-
tor, the need to monitor the originator's financial condition is largely eliminated. 
Although the risks associated with servicing and collecting the receivables still 
necessitate some mOnitoring/I these risks can be bome by providers of credit en-
hancement or investors in subordinated securities, parties who are in the· business of 
precisely assessing and absorbing such risks.62 
Securitization, thus, creates genuine cost reductions. By eliminating the risk 
of bankruptcy to investors, many different types of companies can better utilize 
their most valuable asset, their receivables, by accessing low cost capital market 
funding. 
V. Untapped Opportunities 
The greatest benefit of securitization is its potential for bringing low cost 
capital market financing to companies that would otherwise be unable to access the 
capital markets. Yet some of the most promising candidates for securitization, such 
as hospitals and middle market companies, have yet to capitalize on its advan-
tages. These types of originators are generally unrated or rated less than invest-
60 The SPV's :receivables, for example, cannot be claimed by unsecured creditors of the 
originator except through the originator's equity interest in the SPV. See supra note 52. How-
ever, as previously discussed in Part 11 to the extent that the receivables sold in a securitization 
mightbe adversely affected by the Originator's bankruptcy, such as is the case with franchise 
fees, the process of securitization is made more difficult. See ScHw ARCZ, supra note 6, at 7-9, 11-
13. 
61 For an example of the need for monitoring in securitization cases, see Mark H. Adel-
son, Seller/Servicer Fraud and the Towers Situation, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, STRUCTURED 
FINANCE, SPEOAL REroRT, June 1993. 
62 As previously discussed in Part II, some originators use a senior f subordinate struc-
ture to create a specialized assumption of risk. By causing the SPV to issue a combination of 
senior securities to ordinary capital market investors and subordinated securities to sophisti-
cated investors, an originator can minimize the effect of asymmetric information among inves-
tors and thereby obtain a lower blended interest rate and therefore lower credit costs. Credit 
enhancement mlnimizes the effect of asymmetric information among investors through the use of 
highly rated institutions that wish to profit by guaranteeing all or a portion of the securities 
issued to investors. This discussion of monitoring costs assumes that the reduction of monitor-
ing costs in a securitization does not increase the monitoring costs of unsecured creditors. In 
the author's experience, companies that engage in securitizatiQns also have contractual unse-
cured creditors, such as banks and insurance company lenders, with covenants that enable them 
to monitor the debtor with at least the care performed by secured lenders. As a result, the 
author believes that this assumption is correct and that there is not a strict law of conservation 
of mOnitoring costs. 
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ment grade63 and therefore do not have direct access to low cost capital market fi-
nancing. Because of their relatively small size and limited financing requirements, 
transaction costs have for the most part prevented hospitals and middle market 
companies from using securitization. Innovative approaches, such as the recently 
advanced concept of "divisible interests,"H however, may permit middle market 
companies and hospitals to pool their receivables in ways that reduce transaction 
costs and make securitization far more feasible and attractive. 
Companies in bankruptcy represent yet another potentially significant but 
undeveloped resource for securitization:5 Although securitization has resulted in 
significant cost savings for a limited number of large bankrupt companies/6 it has 
yet to be applied to small or medium size companies. One potential tool for the ex-
pansion of securitization to such smaller companies would be the creation of a mul-
tiseller securitization conduit to handle debtor-in-possession financing.67 So long as 
the receivable streams of a bankrupt company remain consistent, they too can be 
used for securitization.68 
Securitization opportunities are m longer limited to the financing of re-
ceivables. Securitization techniques have recently been applied to inventories and 
other assets that do not themselves constitute rights to payment but may nonethe-
less give rise to such rights over time. The potential application of securitization to 
these "future rights" is nearly limitless. Examples of its potential uses range from 
the issuing of capital market securities to finance mineral production payments to 
the securitization of future revenues generated from the enVironmentally-safe har-
vesting and sale of timber in South American rain forests. Securitization can also be 
applied to "project-finance" transactions to help meet the current demand for infra-
structure development and improvemene9 Kravitt, Forrester, and Rosenberg argue 
for the application of securitization to assist in the refinancing of previously con-
63 The tenn "investment grade" technically refers to the rating on a company's long 
term debt securities given by independent rating agencies. An investment grade rating reflects a 
rating agency's prediction that the debt securities will be paid on a timely basis. At the end of 
1992, most medium size or "middle marker' companies either did not have ratings or were rated 
less than investment grade. At that time, even some larger companies, including virtually ~11 a i r-
lines and department stores, did not have investment grade ratings. See Schwarcz, Divisible In-
terests, supra note 34, at 141 n.Si S & P Lowers the Bond Ratings of 3 Big Airlines to Junk, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at 01; 
64 See supra notes 34 & 42-45. 
65 Potential investors would want to obtain assurances with respect to the types of 
issues that make a securitization with a company on the brink of bankruptcy risky, because a 
securitization of a company in bankruptcy requires court approval to be consummated. 
66 See ScHWARC2, supra note 6, at 40-45. 
67 Such conduits have been given the term debtor-in-possession company, or "OIPCO:' 
68 Oebtor-in-possession securitization transactions have occurred with and without 
third-par~ credit support. See 5CHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 44. 
• See J. Paul Forrester, et aI., Securitization of Project Finance Loans and Other Private 
Sector Infrastructure Loans, THE FINANCIER: ACMT, 1994, at 7. 
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structed and operational infrastructure projects. Waiting until after the completion 
of the project, they note, would enable investors to more accurately predict the rate 
of defaulfo and therefore result in lower rates.71 
Securitization might also be used to finance infrastructure projects from 
their inception. Such a transaction would presumably involve the present sale of 
future revenues to be generated by the completed project. The major obstacles to this 
type of transaction would be the difficulty inherent in evaluating the riskiness as-
sociated with the project's completion,72 as well as the risk associated with the se-
curitization of future inrome not arising from an existing contract.ll While such 
transactions would have uncertainties regarding the generation of future revenues 
and the creation of bankruptcy remote structures, the techniques and methods of se-
curitization may well prove a useful starting point in considering how to structure 
the transactions. 
Another almost unlimited opportunity to use securitization is provided by 
the growing desire to bring low cost U.s. capital market financing to foreign origina-
tors. As with other areas in which securitization is not yet widely utilized, certain 
risks may make such cross-border transactions less feasible. These risks include un-
certainties concerning foreign currency exchange, tax, and sovereignty as well as 
problems related to dealing with legal systems that may be unsophisticated in as-
set based finance. Nevertheless, given the potential size and scope of this undevel-
oped area, the rewards for pursuing cross-border securitization may be great. 
Other opportunities for securitization may be politically influenced. 
While the House of Representatives adopted Representative Paul Kanjorski's bill 
promoting the securitization of commercial loans in 1994/4 the Senate inc()rporated 
provisions75 into its version of the Community Development Banking bill that a t-
tempt to create a favorable legal framework for banks wishing to securitize their 
70 The rate of default of infrastructure projects which depend on future customers, 
such as power plants, can generally be determined through the use of demographic studies. For 
example, the default rates of power projects can be evaluated based on the project's capacity 
and ener9r sale agreement. See id. at 10. 
Id. at 18. 
72 Aside from the underlying business risks, licensing problems and community opposi-
tion sometimes can interfere with the completion of certain prQjects. For example, examine the 
circumstances surrounding the Von Roll hazardous waste incinerator in Ohio which was tem-
porarily enjOined by the EPA due to the actions of Vice President Gore, and the circumstances 
surrounding the closing Qf the Shoreham Wading River Nuclear Power Plant in New York. 
73 Section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code stlltes that assets acquired by a debtor after 
the filing of a bankruptcy petition may not be subject to a pre-bankruptcy security interest. 11 
U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988). Even though an Spy may have acquired the future rights to a project's 
income, § 552(a) may cut off those rights in income generated after the project becomes subject to 
a bankruptcy case unless, for example, the future income arises under a presently existing con-
tract. See Schwarcz, Divisible interests, supra note 34, at 149 n.36. . 
74 H.R. 2600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). 
15 These provisions were referred to as the Small Business Loan Securitization and 
Secondary Market Enhancement Act of 1993, S. 384, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
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small business loans." The Reigle Community Development and Regulatory Im-
provement Act of 1994/' as enacted, generally adopted the Senate's approach, 
thereby permitting investors that presently do not lend directly to small businesses 
to invest in capital market securities backed by these loans. Therefore, banks wi 11 
be able to replace the loans presently on their books with cash and, in tum, make 
new loans to small businesses.78 
VI. Conclusion 
ln many cases, securitization not only reduces an originator's direct financing 
costs but also provides significant indirect benefits. Securitization entails real costs, 
however, and therefore should only be used after comparison with alternative 
sources of funding. Because securitization has only been applied to a portion of its 
potential market opportunities, it promises to be a financing technique that will 
continue to groW.79 Securitization, in short, brings to financial technolOgy what the 
sought-after philosopher's stone promised to bring to base metals-the ability to 
turn them into gold!80 +" 
76 Provisions of S. 384 were incorporated into an amendment in the nature of a substi-
tute to the Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1993, S. 1275, 
103d Cong., 1stSess. (1993), by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
on September 21,1993. 
77 Pub. L. No. 103·325 (Sept. 23, 1994). The Act also amends the Secondary Mortgage 
Enhancement Act of 1984 to add commercial real estate related securities to the types of mort-
gage related securities that are accorded relief from certain trading and investment restrictions. 
78 Hearings on S. 384 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1993) (Statement of the Honorable Frank N. Newman, Under Secretary 
of the Treasury). 
79 According to data compiled by the Securities Data Corporation and estimates per-
formed by Citicorp, the annual issuance of asset-backed securities, exclusive of mortgage-backed 
securities, grew from over $60 billion in 1989 to over $130 billion in 1993, and the total asset-
backed securities currently outstanding exceeds $300 billion. Telephone Interview with Frank 
J. Cavallo, Vice President of Securitization at Citicorp Securities, Inc. ijune IS, 1994). The 
mortgage-backed securities market presently has $2.45 trillion of securities outstanding, repre-
senting a combination of $2.3 trillion in government guaranteed securities (Ginnie-Mae, Fannie-
Mae, and Freddie-Mac) and $150 billion non-govemment guaranteed. See INSIDE MORTGAGE 
SECURITIES, June 10, 1994, at 2. 
80 The philosopher's stone was an imagined substance which allegedly had the power 
to transform base metals into gold. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIvERsIDE UNIVERSITY DICMONARY 882 
(1984). 
